# Contestation and participation: Concepts, measurement, and inference

Vanessa Alexandra Boese1, Matthew Charles Wilson2

1 Author affiliation

  <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6905-1822>

2 Author affiliation

  <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6905-1812>

**Corresponding author(s):**

Vanessa Alexandra Boese, Email: vanessa.boese@v-dem.net

# Abstract

Contestation and participation are commonly viewed as two main constituent dimensions of electoral democracy. How exactly have these two dimensions been conceptualized and measured in the literature? Are they empirically observable and do they matter for democratic devel *[Please complete this section by adding your own content]*

***Keywords****:* fake news, misinformation, dual-process theory, two-response paradigm

# Contestation and participation: Concepts, measurement, and inference

# Introduction

The questions of whether democracy consists of multiple dimensions and how they work together have been of theoretical interest to scholars well before empirical measures of democracy became widely available.  *[Please complete this section by adding your own content]*

# Concepts

This section provides an overview of the way that scholars have evoked and described the concepts of contestation and participation, aside from the broader debate of how democracy as a whole should be conceptualized.  *[Please complete this section by adding your own content]*

# Measurement

## Subtitle 1

The ability to bear out early claims about political development and the dimensionality of democracy was initially limited by the newness of empirical approaches and the lack of available data at the time.  *[Please complete this section by adding your own content]*

## Subtitle 2

Contestation and participation became widely accepted dimensions of democracy. This is evident in the way that subsequent datasets aggregated indicators to represent components of democracy. *[Please complete this section by adding your own content]*

## Subtitle 3

What scholars think composes each dimension has downstream implications for how contestation and participation might be measured. *[Please complete this section by adding your own content]*

# Inference

As we discussed above, the concepts of contestation and participation are difficult to define in precise terms and have been measured in different ways that have not been shown to be valid representations of those concepts. *[Please complete this section by adding your own content]*

## Issue 1

Conceptual ambiguity and concept-measurement mismatch are partly responsible for perpetuating the belief that contestation and participation are internally consistent concepts whose changes characterize democratic development. *[Please complete this section by adding your own content]*

## Issue 2

Using similar methods to test the role of deliberation in the continued influence effect (Johnson & Seifert, 1994), wherein people continue to believe in misinformation even after it was retracted or corrected (Lewandowsky et al., 2012), *[Please complete this section by adding your own content]*

## Issue 3

From a practical perspective, the proliferation of false headlines has been argued to pose potential threats to democratic institutions and people by increasing apathy and polarization or even inducing violent behavior (Lazer et al., 2018). *[Please complete this section by adding your own content]*

# Findings and ways ahead

As we discussed above, the concepts of contestation and participation are difficult to define in precise terms and have been measured in different ways that have not been shown to be valid representations of those concepts. *[Please complete this section by adding your own content]*.

# Conclusion

As we discussed above, the concepts of contestation and participation are difficult to define in precise terms and have been measured in different ways that have not been shown to be valid representations of those concepts. *[Please complete this section by adding your own content]*

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**Figure 1**

*True and False Politically Neutral Headlines Rated as Accurate Across Conditions*

*Note.* Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.

**Figure 2**

*True and False Political Headlines Rated as Accurate Across Conditions and Political Concordance*

*Note.* Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.